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Finding the Still Small Voice: The
Liability of Bankruptcy Trustees and




This article will examine section 3.3.2 of the Report of the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission (the "Commission").
That section attempts to clarify and improve the present state of
law governing liability and fiduciary obligations of trustees in
bankruptcy. However, as I will explain, the Commission's proposal
is dramatically flawed and represents a grand failure to untangle a
variety of legal doctrines confused by bankruptcy courts since the
adoption of the Code.
However, before evaluating this recommendation in earnest,
I would like to interject some good, "old time" religion. Fear not:
I do not want to convert anyone to any religious persuasion. I
know the reader may not be expecting this digression, but bear
with me. There is a very real connection between the message of
this story and the lesson it teaches and what other scholars and I
have been asked to do in this symposium edition of the Dickinson
Law Review.
There is a famous story in the Bible of how the prophet Elijah
(with obvious help from above) destroyed the prophets of a then
powerful cult, the cult of Ba'al. Jez'bel, who was queen of Israel,
was a follower of Ba'al and had previously killed all the other
prophets of God but Elijah. According to the story, God gave
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Elijah an unenviable task: to cause the people to repent and return
to God, to reject their own enchantment with the cult in the face
of a powerful and violent queen. But how was Elijah to do so?
How was he to persuade the multitude of Israel to turn away from
what seemed an inexorable and self destructive path?
Elijah chose pyrotechnics. Elijah proposed a test: his God
versus Ba'al, before all the people. Elijah laid out an alter and
offering before the assembled multitude of Israel. The prophets of
Ba'al did likewise. Then, rather than setting fire to the offerings in
the traditional way, the prophets, false and real, called on their
respective gods to light up the offerings. Elijah called Fire from
Heaven and destroyed his offering, proving his God real and Ba'al
false.
Elijah did not stop there, however. In the power of the
moment, Elijah commanded the multitude to seize the prophets of
Ba'al and kill them.
Elijah was a powerful man, used to giving commands and
proving his word with dramatic deeds. He used pyrotechnics in an
attempt to bring his people to a better path. But did he really
change the hearts of his people? True, they saw the results with
their own eyes and they respected the power of all that happened,
but had they been truly persuaded?
After conquering the prophets of Ba'al Elijah fled, knowing
that Jezebel would not be happy with the outcome. Elijah
retreated to a cave and God found him there. It is then that Elijah
expressed his despondency. He admitted that he failed to really
teach his people anything and had, instead, resorted to violence to
make his ultimate point. He went so far as to tell God that he
wanted to die, for "I am no better than my fathers."1
This story is dramatic, surely. But so far, at least, it has no
connection with anything we might do or say at this symposium.
It is what happened next that has importance for us here today,
and why I repeat this story; Elijah learns a lesson in persuasion.
The Bible then says:
And God said, "Go forth, and stand upon the mount
before the Lord." And behold, the Lord passed by, and a great
and strong wind rent the mountains, and broke in pieces the
rocks before the Lord, but the Lord was not in the wind; and
after the wind, an earthquake, but the Lord was not in the
1. 1 Kings 19:4.
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Earthquake; and after the Earthquake, a fire, but the Lord was
not in the fire; and after the fire, a still, small voice. And when
Elijah heard it, he wrapped his face in his mantle and went out
and stood at the entrance of the cave. And behold, there came
a voice to him, and said, "What are you doing here, Elijah?"2
The problem, as Elijah learned, is that earthquakes and storms
do not persuade. We have all felt this at times. When we argue
over an emotional point with colleagues and friends, we lose any
hope for persuasion when we begin yelling. The other person more
often than not yells even louder back or retreats stonefaced from
the barrage. It is the still small voice that destroyed Elijah's will,
or perhaps, opened his eyes. It is the "still small voice" that forces
introspection and reflection.
This is one of my favorite passages, and one that we might
think about now. This article reflects on the work and recommen-
dations of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission. The year
preceding the Commission Report of October 22, 1997, has been
marked by incredible propaganda and publicity campaigns. Lives
and livelihoods, businesses and reputations are at stake: bankruptcy
law touches debtors and families, employees of debtors, creditors,
who may be individuals or entities, and countless others. And in
the last year, there has been an endless succession of earthquakes,
floods (of information), and storms (of protest). And yet, I would
ask of the reader, were you persuaded, or even forced to rethink
and verify your position, when confronted with shrill, caustic
protests?
This last year and a half has been characterized by direct and
indirect attempts to influence the Commission-direct at hearings
and in correspondence and indirect in the attempts of different
organizations and interested parties to influence public opinion.
Editorial writers decried the state of the American debtor and the
huge number of personal filings. Even electronically there was a
din and chorus, for a massive amount of information is available
online. Academics have sometimes also been shrill and loud and
cannot always claim greater dignity throughout this process.
But I think that here, as a part of this symposium, we have
been asked to provide the "still small voice." I believe that this is
just what my colleagues on this panel have done in their presenta-
2. 1 Kings 19:11-13.
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tions and in their articles. They have sliced through the cacophony
of conflicting protests to allow for meaningful reflection.
The "still small voice" may mean many things, and certainly
different things to different people. Social scientists might calmly
proffer statistical evidence for one position or another (that, for
example, the huge volume of consumer bankruptcies may be traced
to a particular root cause). Behavioral scientists might quietly
explain the effects (or lack thereof) of the "bankruptcy stigma" and
its deterrent effect on filing. But this symposium is a panel of law
professors, and, although we might effectively comment on these
and other issues, legal doctrine is our stock and trade. We deal,
and are expected to deal, with doctrine, terminology, and statutory
structure better than any other group. I will, therefore, limit my
attention to legal doctrine; it is here where I best find my "still
small voice."
For all of its faults, I like the Bankruptcy Code. I teach it
every year. I have grown fond of its language and its structure. I
know that others will be somewhat surprised, and even cynical,
about this. The original 1978 Code was neither so precise as to
eliminate flexibility of courts and parties nor so vague as to lack
guidance.3 I would like to see this Code survive a bit longer, and
with some dignity.
Law professors and other wonderful, competent, and creative
lawyers were involved in the Commission activity at all levels and
at all times. It is therefore disappointing that doctrine and
terminology received such poor attention at times.4 In particular,
section 3.3.2 of the Report, which modifies, and supposedly clarifies
personal liability and performance standards for bankruptcy
trustees, represents a failure to incorporate different and important
legal doctrines. This is frustrating for many reasons, perhaps
mostly because careful scholarship dating back to 1979 effectively
explains these doctrines and was available to the drafters.
3. The Code is in this way much different from the Internal Revenue Code which has
a seemingly endless and comprehensive set of regulations.
4. I do not intend my criticism to show any lack of respect for the individuals who
worked so hard to put this Report together; just my thoughtful concerns. The drafters of this
report expect careful evaluation of their work, and they expect disagreement. I do not for
a moment doubt the extraordinary talent, good faith and well meaning efforts of the drafters.
But I do believe that in the heated, give-and-take of the hearing, drafting, and voting process,
the language of the Code and its metaphors and doctrinal consistency suffered.
[Vol. 102:4
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This failure has broader implications than might first appear.
On its own, the uncertain liability of trustees in bankruptcy is an
important issue. As the Commission makes clear, the Code will
not operate effectively unless qualified and honest people are
willing to serve as trustees. But, the provision ultimately drafted
by the Commission suggests that the Commission ignored or
misunderstood basic legal doctrine. If adopted, the provision would
undermine the doctrinal integrity of the Bankruptcy Code.
Furthermore, the provision would effect a major and unacknowl-
edged change in the nature of the fiduciary obligations of the
Debtor in Possession (hereinafter the "DIP") in Chapter 11
bankruptcies.
Yet, despite the limited focus of this review, I do have a
general point that I hope to address at different times throughout:
codes, and this includes the Bankruptcy Code, derive much of their
legitimacy, and certainly their workability, from some significant
degree of underlying consistency-consistency in terminology,
doctrinal basis, and policy goals. On the last count, the Bankruptcy
Code has been subject to both criticism and bewilderment. Is there
a constant policy explanation for what the Bankruptcy Code does,
or is there irreconcilable tension between provisions attempting to
achieve a host of sometimes contradictory goals? Is the Code a
vehicle for debt collection, or more?5 But even if this last issue
remains unresolved, the Code should benefit from the consistent
use of terms and doctrinal sources. And any code riddled with
terminological inconsistencies and doctrinal confusion must
ultimately fail. Indeed, it is just this kind of confusion that will one
day in the future lead to yet another commission, one with the
express purpose of not just modifying the Bankruptcy Code but
replacing it.
Part II of this article explains the doctrinal bases of a bank-
ruptcy trustee's personal and representative liability to creditors
and others. There is considerable misunderstanding in the law, in
5. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL H. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 6-7 (1991) (presenting a recent and influential description of corporate
structure as a contract). The view that relations among shareholders and officers and
directors can be described in contractual terms has been stridently criticized. See Victor
Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 1403 (1985). See also Daniel B. Bogart, Liability of Directors of Chapter 11 Debtors




case opinions particularly, about both the doctrinal bases for
holding a trustee liable for his or her acts and the terminology to
ascribe to these situations. Simply put, a bankruptcy trustee is a
unique person, holding fiduciary obligations to a discrete set of
"beneficiaries," and liable to these persons for a failure to live up
to necessary standards, while simultaneously serving as a function-
ary of the bankruptcy court entitled to a judge's judicial immunity
from suit. But, as we shall see, these are two discrete doctrines and
should apply at different times and in response to different suits.
Only with the legal foundation set does it make sense to repeat
and evaluate the recommendation of the Commission. Therefore,
Part III of this article will analyze the section 3.3.2 of the Commis-
sion's proposal. There are several very obvious problems in the
proposal that have to do with word choice as much as anything
else. But, as we shall see, the primary problems with this proposal,
and there are many, result from doctrinal errors.
The doctrinal (and perhaps simply drafting) errors fall into
several categories. These include, but are not limited to (1) a
failure to distinguish properly between fact sets calling for judicial
immunity analysis and those calling for fiduciary analysis; (2) a fully
circular definition of fiduciary obligations for all trustees, except
Chapter 11 trustees and; (3) the establishment of a Chapter 11
trustee's obligations that stands the meaning and direction of the
Code on its head. This latter error results from the longstanding
failure of scholars and courts to apply and take seriously the
Supreme Court's two-time directive that the DIP derives its
standards and liability from the trustee and not the other way
around.6 Yet, the recommendation of the Commission reverses
the correct application of the trustee/debtor in possession relation-
ship. Even more bizarre, the Report contains the statement that it
does not alter the obligations of the DIP when it does so radically.
Throughout this article, I will pinpoint the failure of the drafter
to correctly appraise basic bankruptcy law doctrine and the
unfortunate consequences.
6. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985)
(noting that directors of the DIP "have essentially the same fiduciary obligations to creditors
and shareholders as would the trustee for a debtor out of possession"). See also Wolf v.
Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1963).
[Vol. 102:4
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II. A Bankruptcy Trustee's Liability
A. The Nature of the Bankruptcy Trustee
It would be impossible to evaluate properly the Commission's
proposal regarding trustee liability without first getting a handle on
trustee liability law as it presently exists. We ought to begin by
thinking about the trustee in bankruptcy and what a trustee is
meant to be.
A bankruptcy trustee is one of the most peculiar of statutory
creatures. He is simultaneously a fiduciary and a court appointed
officer, and therein lies the problem. Where do the limits of
liability in one role end and the liabilities, and limitations on
liability for the other, begin? This is a daunting question and has
been problematic for courts. This confusion dates from the
Bankruptcy Act and, unfortunately, has been carried through to
cases falling under the current Bankruptcy Code. Underlying this
confusion is a simple but pervasive misunderstanding of trust law
and trust law terminology among academics, lawyers, and judges.
An understanding of trust law is paramount because this is the
terminology upon which the drafter of the Code relied. A
"trustee" is appointed in Chapters 7 and 13, and possibly appointed
in Chapter 11. No specific definition of trust law or package of
trust law duties and liabilities is specified by the Code. In the
absence of a fixed set of trust law definitions and duties, bankrupt-
cy courts have fashioned a common law of trusts for use in
bankruptcy cases. This common law draws upon a host of sources.7
7. See generally Bogart, supra note 5. These sources often include the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts and state law trust cases. For a good recent example of how federal
courts create and apply the common law of trusts to bankruptcy trustees, see Walsh v.
Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. of Milwaukee (In re Ferrante), 51 F.3d 1473, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995).
The court in Ferrante permitted a Chapter 11 trustee to sue a surety (bond company) for the
acts of a prior Chapter 11 trustee in the same case who embezzled from the estate and then
disappeared. The court stated:
When a trustee receives funds as a trustee, he holds them as a fiduciary and is
accountable for them. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170(1) (1959)
(trustee must administer trust solely in beneficiary's interest); id. § 172 (trustee
must render clear and accurate accounts). We would have thought that
proposition ineluctable. Judges have been saying as much for centuries. Yet
attempts by faithless trustees to avoid their obligations continue, and new excuses
are regularly erumpent.
In re Ferrante, 51 F.3d at 1479-80.
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A variety of issues complicate this task. A trustee is limited
by standards of care, loyalty, and impartiality, and these standards
take on a somewhat different cast in bankruptcy practice.
Identifying a bankruptcy trustee's beneficiaries is often difficult.
The trust document, the Code, is not written consistently with an
eye towards explaining the trustee's obligations. This is the
opposite of what a personal trustee's trust document should aim to
achieve. There is also a policy problem underlying a discussion of
trustee liability in bankruptcy. Given the potentially huge array of
potential beneficiaries in some cases, particularly Chapter 11 cases,
there is a great and legitimate fear that trustees will be sued for
mistakes in judgment or for allegations of disloyal behavior. The
Report of the Commission identifies this policy concern explicitly
as driving their proposal.8
The Commission's proposal is not yet law and may never
become so. The question therefore must be: what is the best
understanding of the present state of the law of trustee liability,
and where has it in fact gone awry? The Commission correctly
calls the present state of the law "a crazy quilt" of decisions.9 In
its explanation, the Commission focuses on the famous Supreme
Court case of Mosser v. Darrowt° to help define the liability of
trustees. According to the Commission:
8. See Report of the National Bankruptcy Commission, Oct. 20, 1997, at 860-61
[hereinafter Report].
Any attempt to codify a standard for personal trustee liability runs the risk that
some measures would provide too little protection and some measures would
provide too much protection. Too little protection might expose a trustee to
excessive personal liability and dissuade capable people from becoming trustees.
Id. (footnote omitted). Since the Report adopts a proposal that would change current law,
one can presume that the drafter found the present balance deficient. Given that the new
rules would give greater protection to trustees, it is fair to infer that the Commission believed
that too little protection is now afforded trustees.
9. Report, supra note 8, at 859-60 (quoting memorandum from David W. Allard on
behalf of the National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees, Bankruptcy Trustees Should Be
Provided a Uniform Standard of Care Governing Personal Liability-Support for a Revision
of the United States Bankruptcy Code, April 1997).
10. 341 U.S. 267 (1951). Professor Ralph C. McCullough of the University of South
Carolina School of Law, published an article on the liability of bankruptcy trustees
immediately prior to publication of this article. See Ralph C. McCullough, Trustee Liability:
Is There Enough Protection in These "Arms of the Court?" 103 CoMM. L.J. 123 (1998). I
therefore did not have the opportunity to address Professor McCullough's work and
contribution to the degree to which he would have otherwise been entitled. Professor
McCullough discusses the confusion surrounding the personal liability of bankruptcy trustees,
and then argues that these individuals should not be liable for acts of mere negligence. I
encourage the reader to consult Professor McCullough's article directly.
[Vol. 102:4
LIABILITY OF BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEES
The Bankruptcy Code does not provide a personal liability
standard for bankruptcy trustees. Since 1978, the courts that
have addressed this issue have come to contrary conclu-
sions .... [T]rustees are held to standards of care ranging from
personal liability for negligence to personal liability for willful
and intentional acts in violation of the trustee's duties. Some
courts also find that trustees have derived judicial immunity for
acts taken within the scope of their authority. The only
Supreme Court decision in this area, Mosser v. Darrow, held a
trustee personally liable for allowing his agents to profit at the
estate's expense. Unfortunately, Mosser has not provided much
guidance to subsequent courts and has been cited for a broad
range of positions."
The Commission's quotation is instructive. The Commission
is entirely correct that courts have reached a wide variety of
conclusions when evaluating trustee conduct and liability. And, the
Commission is similarly correct that the Supreme Court's Mosser
decision has resulted in much confusion. But, the Commission is
wrong to suggest that Mosser did not provide useful guidance. As
we shall see in a minute, Mosser has been incorrectly interpreted
and implemented by a variety of courts. The Supreme Court's
mistake was not in reaching the wrong result, but simply in a
sloppy use of trust law terminology. What is frustrating is that the
Commission had the opportunity to reflect upon and then to clarify
case law that relies upon Mosser, but failed to do so. Although the
law that emerged in the wake of Mosser is confusing, a thoughtful
explanation of legal doctrine eliminates this confusion: Mosser is
correct and should be applied and maintained. Not only does the
Commission miss this opportunity, but it actually repeats the worst
of the doctrinal errors and perpetuates and (if successful) codifies
a doctrinally unsound and confusing statement of trustee liability.
1. Two Cases: Mosser v. Darrow and Sherr v. Winkler.-To
understand the state of the common law of bankruptcy trustee
liability now and the mistakes of the Commission, we must look at
two very important cases in the area. As it happens, both predate
the Code. One is the just mentioned Supreme Court case of
Mosser v. Darrow, and the other is the Tenth Circuit Court of
11. Report, supra note 8, at 860-61 (citations omitted).
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Appeals case Sherr v. Winkler.12 The former opinion can rightly
be accused of imprecision in the use of trust language, but not of
outright error. The latter opinion seizes upon this imprecision and
inserts into the law blatant errors which manifest themselves to this
day. The end result has been unfortunate: many bankruptcy courts
protect trustees from personal liability on the basis of derived
judicial immunity in cases when that doctrine is inappropriate.
Courts also distinguish between a trustee's breach of the duty of
care and breach of the duty loyalty, refusing to impose liability for
the latter. And, because the duties and liabilities of the DIP derive
from those of the trustee in bankruptcy, the DIPs will presumably
be similarly treated.
a. Mosser v. Darrow.-Much of the confusion surrounding
the trustee's liability may be traced to the 1951 Supreme Court
decision, Mosser v. Darrow.3 In that case, a bankruptcy trustee
was held personally liable for the self-dealing of his employees. 4
The employees were founders of two common law trusts in
reorganization.15 The trustee permitted these individuals to trade
securities in the trusts during the reorganizations. 6
Now, as the reader no doubt already knows, a trustee that
trades in a debtor's securities engages in self-dealing, a breach of
the duty of loyalty rather than care. Indeed, the Court specifically
stated that "principles of negligence" were not involved in
Mosser.7 The Court recognized that negligence principles would
be appropriate in other instances, specifically where a trustee failed
to "detect defalcations."' 8 (This latter language is classic "duty of
care" terminology, identifying a trustee as negligent for failing to
use the care of a reasonable and prudent trustee to discover
diversions from the trust). Instead, the Court identified the
trustee's failure as the "willful and deliberate setting up of an
12. 552 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1977).
13. 341 U.S. at 267.
14. See id. at 272.
15. See id.
16. See id. See generally Bogart, supra note 5, at 208-10; E. Allan Tiller, Personal
Liability of Trustees and Receivers in Bankruptcy, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 75, 94-96 (1979).
Tiller's article and his important, if too often ignored, contributions are discussed in detail,
infra Part II.B. See also McCullough, supra note 10 (citing Tiller throughout his piece).
17. Mosser, 341 U.S. at 272.
18. Id.
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interest in [the trustee's] employees adverse to that of the trust."' 9
The following paragraph is the culprit and caused this terrible
confusion:
We see no room for the operation of the principles of negli-
gence in a case in which conduct has been knowingly autho-
rized ... . The liability here is not created by a failure to
detect defalcations, in which case negligence might be required
to surcharge the trustee, but is a case of willful and deliberate
setting up of an interest in [the trustee's] employees adverse to
that of the trust.'
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not approach Mosser
with a forthright use of trust law terminology. This might have
nipped the problem in the bud. The Court could have referred to
a breach of the "duty of care" instead of "principles of negligence"
and the "failure to detect defalcations." Similarly, the Court could
have discussed whether the trustee breached his "duty of loyalty"
rather than asking whether he willfully and deliberately set up an
interest adverse to that of the trust. The Supreme Court is not
known for using trust law language well, and its choice of words in
Mosser is, therefore, unsurprising.21
b. Sherr v. Winkler: The One-Two Punch.-Debate and
differing judicial opinion has arisen from the "willful and deliber-
ate" language the Court used in Mosser. The misreading of Mosser
found its most important voice in the Tenth Circuit opinion Sherr
v. Winkler.22 As we shall see, this misreading is just one mistake
the Tenth Circuit made.
i. A Breach of the Duty of Loyalty Begets Personal Liability;
A Breach of the Duty of Care Does Not.-The Sherr court deter-
mined, based on Mosser, that a trustee would only be held
personally liable for a breach of his duties to the extent that the
breach was "willful and deliberate., 23  When a person acts
deliberately, and makes decisions that he knows to be stupid or
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. I made this point in my prior article. See Bogart, supra note 5. See John H.
Langbein, The Supreme Court Trusts, 1990 Sup. Cr. REV. 207 (cited in Bogart, supra note
5, at 202 n.260).
22. 552 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1977).
23. See id. at 1375.
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unwise, then that person acts disloyally. Think about a trustee's
duty to protect and preserve property. If a trustee fails to leave the
warm water dripping in the faucets of a commercial, but unoccu-
pied building during the winter, and the pipes burst as a result, we
would say that he is negligent. But, if he deliberately leaves the
water off, hoping that the pipes will burst, we would not say that
he is negligent. By doing so deliberately, he transforms his
behavior from a breach of the duty of care into a breach of the
duty of loyalty.
Under the rubric of Sherr, however, negligent actions never
result in personal liability. Only actions that are deliberate would,
as a matter of course, result in personal liability. Negligent actions
of a trustee would result in "official" liability only. In other words,
the trust estate would cover the damage resulting from the breach
of care; the trustee would not pay out of his own pocket.
I have previously written:
No policy reason in either trust or bankruptcy warrants treating
the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty differently for the
purpose of determining a trustee's personal liability. The
purpose of fiduciary obligations is to deter a trustee from
engaging in sloppy or disloyal behavior. These devices are
necessary because the cost of monitoring a trustee's behavior is
high, and because the beneficiaries are vulnerable to the
trustee's misbehavior. Fiduciary obligations are meaningless if
a trustee cannot be held liable for a breach. It makes no sense
then to say that a trustee who breaches an obligation of care
does not incur liability. If courts are concerned that trustees
are too easily exposed to liability, the remedy is to grant
trustees wider discretion in the performance of his or her
duties-that is, to make the determination of a breach more
unlikely.24
Yet, this is precisely what the Tenth Circuit, and those circuits and
courts following that court, have done. Where a trustee is held to
have acted negligently, even by the very generous (if somewhat
different) standards applied to bankruptcy trustees in Chapters 7
and 11 cases, these courts do not surcharge the trustee.25 In other
24. Bogart, supra note 5, at 211.
25. With time and inclination, this article might be used as a springboard for a
comprehensive discussion of a trustee's fiduciary obligations in bankruptcy. However, my
1994 article attempted just such a treatment, therefore, it is not my goal to rehash that article
here beyond what is necessary to evaluate the Commission's proposal. Interested readers
[Vol. 102:4
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words, the estate, not the trustee himself, picks up the tab for the
trustee's negligent acts.
It would have been better, and made the error of the Sherr
court more obvious, if that court had spoken clearly in trust law
terms. According to the Sherr court, a trustee will not be liable for
his breach of the duty of care, but he will be liable for his disloyal
conduct.26 One then must ask: what policy or legal analysis
supports this odd result? The Sherr court's decision is contrary to
normal trust law because the only question typically asked is
whether the trustee breached any fiduciary duty. It does not
matter which duty is breached. A breach is a breach is a breach.
As noted, the Supreme Court did not require this result in Sherr,
and, therefore, the most important precedent does not support this
difference in result.
are encouraged to digress to that earlier piece. See Bogart, supra note 5, at 186-204. Still,
some elucidation would be useful. According to the Restatement, a trustee must possess
"such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own
property." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959). Bankruptcy courts have
largely adopted this formulation of a trustee's duty of care in the collection and preservation
of the assets of the estate. See George Benz & Sons v. Lovett (In re Scwen's, Inc.), 20 B.R.
638, 641 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982) (adopting as the standard of care "that of an ordinarily
prudent person in the conduct of his or her private business under similar circumstances").
See also In re Rollins, 175 B.R. 69, 73 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994) (quoting section 170 of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts). Where a trustee operates an ongoing business (as is often
the case), courts grant trustees wide discretion; care has, therefore, come to mean something
a bit more generous in this context. See In re Curlew Valley Assocs., 14 B.R. 506, 511
(Bankr. D. Utah 1981) ("[D]isagreements over business policy are not amenable to judicial
resolution."). The meaning of loyalty for personal trustees, as for bankruptcy trustees, has
largely the same meaning. The Restatement rather broadly states that a trustee acts under
the "duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary
with such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his
own property." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170.
Courts often react spiritedly to evidence of self dealing, conflicts of interest, or
appearances of impropriety on the part of bankruptcy trustees. For a particularly noteworthy
example, see Stubb v. Estrada (In re San Juan Hotel Corp.)" 71 B.R. 413 (D. P.R. 1987),
where a trustee was surcharged for prolonging the life of a Chapter 11 case for the sole
purpose of receiving a salary in connection with the case and taking advantage of the
extensive amenities of a hotel during the reorganization. See also, Walsh v. Northwestern
Nat'l. Ins. Co. (In re Ferrante), 51 F.3d 1473 (9th Cir. 1995) (permitting a successor Chapter
11 trustee to bring suit against the surety of the original trustee to recover funds embezzled
by the original trustee).
The Commission notes briefly that trustees are subject to fiduciary obligations,
although it does not explain the sources of these obligations in any serious manner.
See Report, supra note 8, at 859-60. The Commission states only that "trustees are held to
standards of care ranging from personal liability for negligence to personal liability for willful
and intentional acts in violation of the trustee's duties .... " Id. (footnotes omitted).
26. See Sherr, 552 F.2d at 1375.
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Courts may be concerned that trustees will be unwilling to
serve if hit too often and too hard with allegations of incompe-
tence. But if this is so, it would make more sense to address this
concern within the confines of intelligible doctrine and trust law
rather than rejecting the basic operative elements of that doctrine.
For example, (and the Commission's proposal would do this as
well) the standard of care for a bankruptcy trustee may be lowered
to such a degree that incompetent behavior is difficult to find but
in the most rare of cases. But, if this kind of behavior is ultimately
found, why should trust beneficiaries (creditors) be in a worse
position than if disloyal behavior were uncovered?
Careful doctrinal analysis and a deliberate use of trust law
terminology unwind the Sherr court's mistake. The Tenth Circuit
correctly noted that the trustee in Mosser was held personally liable
for his wrongdoing (a breach of loyalty).27 The Tenth Circuit then
manifested a very basic but nevertheless very important misunder-
standing of trust law terminology. Apparently, it read the Supreme
Court's statement that a trustee might be "surcharged" for
negligent failure to "detect defalcations" to indicate that a
surcharge represents something other than personal liability. 8 In
trust law, and as applied by the Supreme Court in Mosser,
surcharge and personal liability are one and the same.29
27. See id.
28. See id. This error again results from a sloppy and simple misreading. The Tenth
Circuit read Mosser to mean (1) only disloyal activities result in personal liability, and (2)
surcharges apply to negligent actions. See id. The Sherr court was apparently troubled by
the fact that the word "surcharge" appears in the same phrase as "negligence" and reasoned
that the two words belong inextricably together. But since the Court did not suggest
negligent actions do not result in personal liability, the second reading-that surcharges apply
only to negligent actions-also fails.
29. "The language of Sherr is questionable, in that it tries to distinguish the surcharge
of a trustee from personal liability .... Mosser made no such distinction." Tiller, supra
note 17, at 99. Quickly on the heels of the Sherr court, other courts rejected the Sherr
court's misapplication of Mosser. See, e.g., Hall v. Perry (In re Cochise Park, Inc.), 703 F.2d
1339, 1357 n.26 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that surcharge and personal liability are one and the
same). See generally Bogart, supra note 5, at 210-11. It is not entirely possible to determine
exactly where each circuit stands on the issue of personal liability of trustees. The Ninth
Circuit rejects the Sherr court's reading in United States v. Aldrich (In re Ridgen), 795 F.2d
727 (9th Cir. 1986) and the Second Circuit does so in In re Kirchenbaum, 766 F.2d 723 (2d
Cir. 1985). The other prime culprit in perpetuating this misreading of Mosser is the Sixth
Circuit. See Ford Motor Credit v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1982). See also Yadkin
Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. McGee, 819 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1987). See generally Bogart, supra
note 5, at 209 n.303. Courts in other jurisdictions continue to criticize these opinions. A
good recent example would be a case out of the New Hampshire Bankruptcy Court, which
falls under the jurisdiction of the First Circuit. See In re Barrows, 171 B.R. 455, 457 (Bankr.
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ii. Derived Judicial Immunity Versus Fiduciary Doctrine.-The
court in Sherr made another even more destructive error.3" That
court mingled two absolutely distinct legal doctrines: fiduciary
analysis and derived judicial immunity. Indeed, the court's entire
analysis of a trustee's personal liability for negligent as opposed to
disloyal activity may have been unnecessary. The trustee in Sherr
was sued by a non-beneficiary of the debtor's estate for a tort, not
by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary obligations. The only
analysis called for is that of derived judicial immunity. And that
analysis is simple: so long as a trustee was acting within the scope
of his authority, a trustee, like a judge, cannot incur personal
liability.
In Sherr, the plaintiffs alleged that the Chapter X trustee
procured a Turnover Order of "funds realized from production of
oil belonging to plaintiffs."31 Trustees in bankruptcy reorganiza-
tions and liquidations, (both under the Act and today under the
Code) may use and dispose of "property of the estate." Property
belonging to a person other than the debtor, or property in which
the debtor has no rights, is not property of the estate. The
plaintiffs in Sherr were not creditors of the debtor. Their only
interest in the bankruptcy was the return of their funds, and these
funds were not rightfully in the hands of the trustee. The trustee
did not act maliciously by taking the funds, nor even negligently.
This was simply a very difficult and complex reorganization, and
determining which funds from which production assets belonged to
D. N.H. 1994) ("We reject the approach of the Tenth and Sixth Circuits which, in an appar-
ent misreading of the seminal case of Mosser v. Darrow, have concluded that a bankruptcy
or reorganization trustee may be held personally liable only for damages only for injuries
arising from intentional-as opposed to negligent--conduct.") (citations omitted). Similarly,
recent scholarly opinion continues to view the Sherr opinion as a misreading of Mosser v.
Darrow and to argue that bankruptcy trustees must be held personally liable for negligent
behavior. See Carlos J. Cuevas, The Myth of Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Reorganization
Cases, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 385, 392-93 (1998). Professor Cuevas states:
With all due deference, the Tenth and Sixth Circuits misconstrued Mosser v.
Darrow. The Supreme Court never discussed the issue of what was the standard
for imposing liability on a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, as a matter
of law, these courts have misinterpreted the law, and made the enforcement of
fiduciary duties against a debtor-in-possession more difficult.
Id. at 392.
30. The error was destructive in the sense that any hope for a doctrinally consistent and
satisfying analysis was placed beyond reach.
31. Sherr, 552 F.2d at 1369.
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the debtor was an unusually daunting task. The trustee was proven
wrong in due course, but he was not proven to be foolish.
32
Unfortunately, the Sherr court ignored the correct and basic
analysis of the problem. It should have identified the case as one
in which a plaintiff, to whom no fiduciary duties were owed by the
trustee, was suing for the return of his property. In this case, the
only issue is whether the trustee acted within the scope of his
authority. If so, even if the trustee was wrong (as he was in Sherr),
he would not be any more liable to the plaintiff than a bankruptcy
judge whose ruling is, by appeal or academic discourse, later
proven to be wrong. Them's just the breaks: we all take the chance
in a society driven and controlled by the rule of law that the judge
may be wrong.
As is so often the case, baseball may be the best metaphor
(thus, I digress from one religious metaphor into another). The
umpire may be wrong and call a player "out" when trying to steal
second; the player may show his displeasure, but he cannot sue.
Vis-a-vis non-beneficiaries of the debtor's estate, the trustee is an
umpire, nothing more.33
32. "The trial court found that Winkler [the trustee] acted 'in a fair and proper way in
marshalling the assets' of the estate located in numerous states and that following the hearing
on October 9, 1970, Winkler acted properly, in good faith, and without negligence in
connection with the turnover proceedings." Id. at 1371 (citations omitted). The Tenth
Circuit evaluated the factual record and then determined that the trial court's conclusions
were not "clearly erroneous." Id. at 1376.
33. The trustee has the capacity to sue and be sued as representative of the estate.
See 11 U.S.C. § 323(b) (1994). Rule 6009 of the Federal Bankruptcy Rules of Civil
Procedure further provides the trustee of the DIP the right to prosecute cases, appear and
defend those cases in front of any tribunal. See FED. BANKR. R. Civ. P. 6009. See generally
WILLIAM MILLER COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 323.03 (15th ed. 1997). The
concept of qualified immunity from suit for governmental officials and persons operating
under the auspices of a court is not limited to bankruptcy trustees. This is an important
concept with broad application. For a nice statement of this general idea, see Bush v. Rauch,
38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994). In that case, the Sixth Circuit held a former probate court
administrator immune from suit. See id. The court officer assessed the stability and maturity
of a minor and incorrectly labeled the child as nonviolent. See id. The operators of a non-
secure "juvenile detention home" with whom the child was placed suffered at the child's
hands and brought suit against the officer in both the officer's official and individual
capacities. See id. at 842-43. The court's language immunizing the probate officer describes
generally the concept of derived judicial immunity and applies equally well to bankruptcy
trustees who act under the specific instructions of a bankruptcy court. The court stated:
It is well established that judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from
suits for money damages for all actions taken in the judge's judicial capacity,
unless these actions are taken in the complete absence of any jurisdiction.
Moreover, absolute judicial immunity has been extended to non-judicial officers
who perform "quasi-judicial" duties. Quasi-judicial immunity extends to those
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There is an easy way to answer the question of whether a
trustee is entitled to derived judicial immunity. If the trustee in
bankruptcy enters a contract and breaches it, or if the trustee is
alleged to have committed a tort, then the trustee ought to be able
to defend himself on the grounds that he was acting within the
scope of his authority and thereby assert the defense of derived
judicial immunity. A trustee may, in fact, breach a contract or, by
his actions, commit a tort. The aggrieved parties will then file suit,
often outside of bankruptcy court, for damages.
But when any party sues a trustee in bankruptcy alleging that
the trustee breached some duty of care or loyalty owed to the
plaintiff, and therefore a fiduciary duty, there is no basis for
protecting the trustee pursuant to his derived judicial immunity.'
persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that
these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune. The
Supreme Court has endorsed a "functional" approach in determining whether an
official is entitled to absolute immunity. Under this approach, a court "looks to"
"the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed
it."
Id. at 847 (citations and footnotes omitted). Individuals serving in the Office of the United
States Trustee therefore receive this official judicial immunity. See In re Swift, 185 B.R. 963,
969-70 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995) ("Under this established reasoning, case law has firmly
established that, as an arm of the bankruptcy court, the Trustee merits such quasi-judicial
immunity. Accordingly, the law will absolutely immunize the Trustee for his conduct, unless
he has acted in the clear absence of any authority regarding this matter.") (footnotes
omitted). In Swift, the United States Trustee was sued for slander and libel in response to
the Trustee's motion demanding that lawyers for the Chapter 11 debtor disgorge fees. See
id.
Bankruptcy trustees who act on specific instructions of the court after disclosing all
material information are, in reality, "an arm of the court." To this extent, they deserve the
same immunity a judge would receive for enforcing the orders on his own. See In
re Kashani, 190 B.R. 875, 884 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) ("It has long been established that a
bankruptcy trustee is an officer of the appointing court. As an officer of the court, the
trustee is entitled to a form of derivative judicial immunity from liability for actions carried
out within the scope of the trustee's official duties."). However, bankruptcy trustees do not
usually obtain this' discrete guidance from bankruptcy courts when dealing with estate
property for the benefit of creditors, and, therefore, as between the trustee and his
beneficiaries, the policy of granting absolute immunity from suit by creditors and the debtor
does not ordinarily exist.
34. Although the Sherr court and its progeny confuse these two doctrines, other courts
do not. For example, the court in the recent case of Tennsco Corp. v. Estley Metal Products,
Inc., 200 B.R. 542 (D. N.J. 1996) correctly separates immunity and fiduciary law analyses.
Tennesco epitomizes the correct use of judicial immunity. In Tennsco, the plaintiff purchased
property from the debtor during a Chapter 11 case. See id. at 543. The trustee in
bankruptcy issued the deed. See id. The plaintiff later determined, to its chagrin, that the
property was contaminated by environmental waste. See id. at 544. Plaintiff sued the trustee
demanding that the trustee be held personally liable. See id. at 543. The court noted that
the plaintiff was a "non-party" to the bankruptcy-that is, it had a contractual relationship
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Trustees are simply not "immune" from suits brought by their
beneficiaries.
There is only one instance in which it might be appropriate to
say that a bankruptcy trustee is immune from suit against allega-
tions that he acted negligently or disloyally. Such a situation may
arise when the trustee receives specific instructions from the
bankruptcy court to follow some course of action. If the trustee
revealed all material information to the court and interested parties
had notice and hearing, then the trustee, at worst, was following the
specific instructions of the court and should be immune from suit,
even as against beneficiaries of the trust." In practice, such
with the debtor but was not a creditor. Instead, the plaintiff sought to sue the debtor and
trustee to establish their liability under both state environmental law and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). See id. at 544.
This is similar to suing a trustee for his breach of a contract, or commission of a tort,
post-petition. (Forcing liability under environmental laws would seem to be a combination
of the two, and perhaps something more). In any event, the question remains whether the
trustee was acting within the scope of his authority when issuing the deed and when making
any representation about the property. In this case, the court determined that the trustee
acted within his authority and should be immune from suit. See id. at 544-45. The court
noted that "there is a strong public policy in protecting bankruptcy trustees, since the
imposition of personal liability on bankruptcy trustees for unintentional tortious acts to non-
parties to the bankruptcy proceeding would create a significant disincentive to trustee
service." Id. at 545 (footnote omitted). Yet, the court also explicitly and correctly noted that
this policy would not operate where a trustee is sued by beneficiaries of the bankruptcy trust
for alleged breaches of fiduciary obligation. The court stated:
Moreover, no breach of fiduciary duty by [the trustee] occurred. The sale of the
property by [the trustee] took place as a part of the bankruptcy proceedings, with
[the trustee] acting within the scope of his authority as the bankruptcy trustee for
[the Debtor's estate]. Therefore, since no breach of fiduciary duty occurred, the
negligence standard [otherwise applicable to trustees in the Third Circuit] is
irrelevant to the issue at hand.
Id. See also Illinois Dep't of Revenue v. Schechter, 195 B.R. 380, 384 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("[Ilt
is well settled that a trustee cannot be held personally liable unless he acted outside the
scope of his authority as trustee, i.e., acted ultra vires, or breached a fiduciary duty that he
owed as the trustee to some claimant."). Cf. Walsh v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. of Mil-
waukee (In re Ferrante), 51 F.3d 1473, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995) (Trustees may be held personally
liable for breach of fiduciary duties; the embezzlement of funds from the estate is a clear
violation of the duty of loyalty to creditors.).
35. See In re Markos Guree Partnership, 182 B.R. 211, 218 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1995); In
re Rollins, 175 B.R. 69 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that the trustee was not immune
from personal liability in a suit by a creditor of the estate where the trustee did not reveal
all material information of the court when obtaining a court order to abandon property).
See also Bogart, supra note 5, at 208 (noting that it would be "an unlikely event" for a
bankruptcy trustee to receive instructions of this sort). See also McCullough, supra note 10,
at 140-41.
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instructions are not that common.36  Bankruptcy courts would be
unable to function if they constantly entertained trustees' requests
to review the decisions that the trustee was hired to make.
Given this analysis, the job of the Sherr court was easy. The
court should have noted only that the trustee was acting within the
scope of its authority when it incorrectly identified some of the oil
well proceeds as the debtor's. The court noted the inexperience of
the trustee, but also the necessity that the trustee complete the
difficult business of collecting all of the property of the estate.
Indeed, the larger the debtor's business the more likely that a
mistake will be made. Instead, the court embarked on the rocky
road of fiduciary analysis, even though no beneficiaries were
present.37 The court confused these two distinct, but important,
doctrines.38
Other courts have followed the lead of the Tenth Circuit and
incorrectly evaluated trustee behavior under fiduciary guidelines
36. This is not to say that trustees never seek and receive guidance. For example, see
Holywell Corp. v. Bank of N.Y. (In re Holywell Corp.), 177 B.R. 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In
Holywell, the trustee sought and received instructions from the bankruptcy court to sell
encumbered property and to pay taxes out of proceeds of the sale. After a series of appeals,
the Supreme Court reversed the bankruptcy court. The debtors filed suit against the trustee
in both his representational and individual capacity for "breach of fiduciary duty, gross
negligence, and conspiracy to injure another in the trade, practice or profession." Id. at 991.
The bankruptcy and district courts disagreed with the debtors, however, and determined that
the trustee was immune from the suit of these beneficiaries of the bankruptcy trust because
the trustee had been following lawful and correctly obtained instructions. See id. at 998-99
(affirming the bankruptcy court's determination that "the Trustee complied with each court
order governing the tax issues [and] [ulpon the trustee being acquired to file returns and pay
taxes") (citations omitted).
37. See Sherr, 552 F.2d at 1375-76. The court in Markos Gurnee Partnership correctly
states the rule as follows: "A bankruptcy trustee is personally liable for breach of a duty to
the estate or to creditors of the estate, but may protect against such liability by obtaining a
court order authorizing contemplated action." In re Markos Gurnee Partnership, 182 B.R.
at 218. The Markos court distinguished properly between judicial immunity afforded trustees
as against non-beneficiaries of the estate and the limited immunity granted to trustees as
fiduciaries upon a lawfully obtained court order. The court stated:
It is important to recognize that the "immunity" flowing from a court order
directing trustee action is distinct from the personal immunity discussed above.
Court orders protect trustees from surcharge for action potentially violative of
their bankruptcy-related fiduciary duties; this immunity requires notice to affected
parties and disclosure of relevant facts. The general personal immunity of
bankruptcy trustees-which applies to claims other than for breach of bankruptcy-
related fiduciary duties, arising out of the operation of the estate-renders the
estate rather than the trustee liable without the need for notice or a court order
of any kind.
Id. at 220.
38. See Tiller, supra note 16, at 99-102; Bogart, supra note 5, at 206-08.
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when the only issue should have been the trustee's derived judicial
immunity-that is, whether the trustee functioned properly as the
",umpire."39
Yet, there are times when it is not enough for a trustee to say,
"I acted within the scope of my authority." A trustee cannot hide
behind this mantle when responding to complaints of the beneficia-
ries of the trust. The very nature and rationale of trust law
relationships is that one party (the trustee) holds the property or
wealth of another (the beneficiary) for the other's benefit. In the
case of bankruptcy law, the assets of the debtor (property of the
estate) are held for the benefit of the debtor and creditors. Why
then should it matter that the trustee acted within the scope of his
authority if he damaged the beneficiary?
For example, turn around the facts of Sherr. Assume that a
creditor brings a complaint against the trustee alleging that the
trustee either negligently or disloyally failed to collect all of the
assets of the estate.4 ° The trustee would surely be acting within
the scope of his authority when deciding, under the gun, to pursue
some assets and forego others. A creditor, examining the trustee's
behavior, may nevertheless see, or at least allege, facts supporting
a claim of negligence. Would, and should, the trustee's answer that
he was acting "within the scope of his authority" form a valid
shield?
There is an inherent moral hazard in these types of relation-
ships. The beneficiaries suffer a loss of value when a trustee
negligently handles or disloyally misuses trust property. Trust law,
therefore, creates a set of fiduciary duties for the express purpose
of forcing the trustee to internalize risks that normally fall on the
beneficiaries. Not only does the rationale for judicial immunity fail
to apply here, imposing this doctrine actively interferes with the
regulation of the trust relationship.
39. See, e.g., Weisman v. Hassett, 47 B.R. 462, 465-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Searles v. Dye
(In re Noakes), 104 B.R. 323, 326-27 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989). In truth, these are the same
cases that I cited in 1994. See Bogart, supra note 5, at 207, n.294. As I said in my prior
article, courts more typically (and incorrectly) inject immunity language into cases calling for
fiduciary analysis. See id. I have not discovered any more recent cases making the identical
mistake to Sherr, that is, injecting fiduciary analysis into cases calling solely for fiduciary
analysis.
40. Or, as where the trustee had a pre-existing relationship with another creditor and
chose to forego a preference action.
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Unfortunately, some courts apply immunity language and
doctrine where fiduciary relationships exist."a One might say
simply that negligent behavior is never within the scope of the
trustee's authority. Courts say much the same thing about disloyal
behavior. But this would permit the continued confusion of the
two doctrines. I suggest a more direct approach: issues of
negligence and disloyalty are all that matters in cases where
beneficiaries bring complaints. Similarly, although facts leading to
a determination of negligence and disloyalty might be adduced in
a trial by a non-beneficiary against the trustee, one can only be
disloyal or incompetent vis-a-vis persons to whom one owes these
duties. As I note below, this is, unfortunately, an error that the
Commission makes.
I have previously written that the Sherr court, and other courts
that evaluate the behavior of trustees in bankruptcy, could avoid
these basic errors in doctrine by simply asking the "foundational"
question: is the person who brings this suit in a fiduciary relation-
ship with the trustee? In other words, the bankruptcy court's first
job is simply to carefully parse through the facts and classify the
party wronged by the trustee's actions.
B. Tiller, Bogart, and Thoughtful Case Opinions
I evaluated and wrote about this doctrinal confusion in 1994.42
That section of my article in the American Bankruptcy Law Journal
was largely an update of what E. Allan Tiller wrote in the
American Bankruptcy Law Journal in 1979. This scholarly record
was available for the drafters to read.
41. For example, see Dana Commercial Credit v. Nisselson (In re Center Teleproduc-
tions, Inc.), 112 B.R. 567, 576 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). See generally Bogart, supra note 5,
at 207.
42. See Bogart, supra note 5, at 202-12. That article carefully evaluated the differences
between fiduciary and immunity analysis and the occasional mistaken confused application
of these doctrines by bankruptcy courts. However, that article attempted more than an
analysis of whether trustees may be held personally liable and under what circumstances.
The largest portion of that article examined the nature of fiduciary obligations in Chapter
11. Specifically that portion of the article examined (1) the rationale of subjecting directors
of the DIP to duties of care and loyalty; (2) whether a business judgment rule truly operates
in Chapter 11 and; (3) the meaning of a duty of "impartiality" in Chapter 11. Finally, the
article presented a focused examination of two specific cases, Fulton State Bank v. Schipper
(In re Schipper), 109 B.R. 832 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989), affd, 112 B.R. 917 (N.D. IUl. 1990),
afftd, 933 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1991); and In re Integrated Resources, Inc., 135 B.R. 746 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 147 B.R. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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In fairness, there are a multitude of articles on bankruptcy law
on law library shelves. Every law professor and lawyer who has
published an article that addresses some issue that is dealt with by
the Commission in its report might, with puffed up self-importance,
say, "If they had just read my article, they would not have made
this mistake." In my case, I buried my discussion of trustee liability
fifty-five pages into a one hundred and ten page article (and
thereby committed an error traditional to younger law professors
on the tenure track).
However, Mr. Tiller's piece was out there, on point, and also
in a journal devoted entirely to bankruptcy issues. It appeared in
1979, just after the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, and it
followed the decision that it specifically criticized, Sherr v. Winkler.
It nailed the doctrinal errors committed by the Sherr court.
Careful legal analysis and citations accompanied each of the
Commission's proposals. The Report was not intended just to list
proposals, but to persuade. And each proposal was discrete and
reflected independent and thorough work. Mr. Tiller's article
should have been noted, if only to be rebutted.
But even without spotting scholarship directly on point, the
doctrinal error the Commission committed is one courts have
grappled with, and one that, however inelegantly, the Commission
recognized by noting the confusion in the area. Instead of
resolving the problem, the Commission proposes to make it part of
the statute itself.
43
Well then, one wonders if anything has happened in the law of
trusts, in bankruptcy law, or in the conventional understanding of
derived judicial immunity, to change Mr. Tiller's (and my)
conclusions since we published our respective views on the subject.
The answer is, unsurprisingly, no. Courts have not become more
sophisticated, at least on this set of issues, and both academics and
courts continue to make the same mistakes.'
43. Indeed, this raises a serious question about what law professors do and whether
what we do matters. Law professors played important roles in the Commission process.
Why write if we are not read? With a significant rewriting of the Code in progress, one
expects that the drafters would look to the efforts of legal scholars over the last twenty years.
Now, it would be impossible to read everything, or even a large portion of all that was
written on bankruptcy issues in that time. But once particular aspects of the operation of
the Code were identified as "subject to rewrite," it would have been possible to create a list
or bibliography of articles directly on point.
44. The Commission's Report is itself an academic document (no pun intended, it may
or may not be rendered "academic") and is, therefore, an example of the continuing failure
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Still, not all circuits and bankruptcy courts make this error.
For example, in the case of In re Rollins," Judge Michael S.
McManus, of the Eastern District of California, recognized the
distinction between immunity doctrine and fiduciary doctrine. In
re Rollins was a Chapter 7 case. The trustee made the foolish
decision to rely entirely on the word of the debtor for information
about an inheritance that should have been property of the
estate.46 As the court correctly noted, the trustee in a Chapter 7
filing has a non-discretionary duty to promptly investigate assets of
the estate and then collect those assets. The United States Trustee
filed a motion to surcharge the trustee, that is, to hold the trustee
personally liable.4' The trustee had an obviously difficult time
arguing that his behavior was reasonable. Instead, the trustee
suggested that his failure to investigate was the court's fault
because the bankruptcy court, on the trustee's motion, ruled that
the trustee should abandon the inheritance. Unfortunately, the
trustee fied this motion after the debtor "had [already] disap-
peared" with the money.48
Judge McManus identified the correct rule and surcharged the
trustee. According to the judge, "[w]hen sued by someone other
than a debtor or a creditor, the trustee may also claim a limited
immunity., 49 This immunity, according to Judge McManus, may
be incurred on the basis of tort or contract law but not fiduciary
law. According to the judge, the only time a trustee may claim
derived judicial immunity when sued by a beneficiary is "[i]f a
trustee, prior to taking action, and after making a full disclosure of
all relevant facts, obtains a court order .... , In Rollins, the
trustee failed to make one critical disclosure: the fact that the
debtor absconded with the money. Judge McManus is to be
commended for untangling a doctrinal knot that eluded the
Commission.
As noted, Rollins was a Chapter 7 case. But there is nothing
in the Code to indicate that the fiduciary obligations of Chapter 7
of scholars and courts to make sense of judicial immunity and trustees' duties.
45. 175 B.R. 69 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994).
46. See generally id.
47. See id. at 73.
48. Id. at 77.
49. Id. at 77, n.7.
50. In re Rollins, 175 B.R. at 77. See also In re Markos Gurnee Partnership, 182 B.R.
211, 218 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1995).
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trustees differ from those of Chapter 11 trustees. True, Chapter 7
trustees and Chapter 11 trustees have somewhat different responsi-
bilities under sections 704 and 1106, but nowhere in these sections
do the drafters deign to tell us the extent of the trustee's personal
liability or explain the trustee's duties of "honesty," "loyalty" and
"care." I suppose there may be reasons to apply different
standards of care at different times in Chapters 7 and 11. But, do
we really want "loyalty, .... deceit," and "self dealing" to mean
different things in different chapters? No case suggests this is
warranted, and no philosophy supports it.
As to the duty of care, there is a rationale for a difference in
obligation and, therefore, in personal liability of the trustee. A
trustee managing a massive Chapter 11 bailout and facing innumer-
able business decisions demands wide discretion. His goal is to
resuscitate the business. On the other hand, the prototypical
Chapter 7 requires the trustee to collect property of the estate and
then to distribute it. In Chapter 7 cases, the goal of the trustee is
to "preserve" the estate; let the creditors waste the property if that
is to happen. Chapter 11 trustees, and their debtor in possession
predecessors, may have to do more than simply preserve the estate.
The business continues, competition continues, markets change, and
choices must be made. Discretion is necessary and case opinion
provides this to trustees.51 Yet, the Code does not actually hint
at different standards of care or liability.
But if you think about it for more than a moment, you will see
that there is good reason not to place into statute even these
modest differences between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 standards of
care." The reason is simple: Chapter 7 trustees are occasionally
forced to run ongoing businesses in the hopes of selling them whole
during bankruptcy, and, conversely, Chapter 11 trustees often
liquidate parts, and perhaps even all, of the debtor's estate.53 A
Chapter 7 trustee running an ongoing business will be faced with
51. In my article in the American Bankruptcy Law Journal, I argued that, while this
discretion is wide, it is not truly equivalent to that afforded by the "business judgment rule."
Bogart, supra note 5, at 222-24. Other scholars and certainly courts have described Chapter
11 care requirements in this way, but careful analysis of what bankruptcy courts actually do
indicates that courts always consider the substance of the trustee's decision even where an
obviously rational basis existed for that action. See id.
52. That is, I do not want Congress to amend the Code to institute these standards.
53. Chapter 11 explicitly recognizes the possibility of a liquidating plan in section
1141(d)(3) which denies the debtor a discharge if the debtor is liquidated and ceases business
as a result of the plan.
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all of the same worries and choices as a Chapter 11 trustee running
the same business. Moreover, a Chapter 11 trustee liquidating the
debtor's estate pursuant to the plan should have as his primary
responsibility the collection and preservation of the debtor's estate
prior to the distribution to creditors. It should not matter what
chapter the trustee finds himself in. Rather, it is the nature of the
debtor's estate and business that determines what we mean by
'"care."
It should come as no surprise that "preservation of the estate"
language appears in Chapter 7 cases and "business judgment rule"
language appears in Chapter 11 cases. But this is not because the
Code preordains a specific fiduciary obligation; instead, the typical
Chapter 7 and 11 cases necessitate this.
To summarize, the 1978 Code did not spell out the fiduciary
obligations or the extent of personal liability of trustees in
bankruptcy. Instead, the Code imported the concept of the trustee
generically leaving the details to courts and lawyers. In this
vacuum, courts struggle and trustees remain uncertain. Disparities
in the treatment of trustees have resulted. Some courts incorrectly
distinguish between breaches of the duty of loyalty and the duty of
care when determining whether to hold trustees personally liable
by focusing on "willful and deliberate" behavior as opposed to
"negligent" behavior. Similarly, courts confuse two distinct legal
doctrines: a trustee's derived judicial immunity and a trustee's
fiduciary obligations to beneficiaries of the bankruptcy trust. These
areas of confusion exist independently of policy objectives.
Whether you think trustees should be virtually immune from suit
and owe no substantial fiduciary obligations to creditors or anyone
else, or if you believe that trustees need to be monitored closely,
your view is not really served by this uncertainty. Moreover, this
uncertainty and confusion arises from a misunderstanding of
doctrine and a sloppy use of trust law language.
III. The Commission's Proposals: Confusion Written into Law
With this lesson in legal doctrine and the history of trustee
liability behind us, the question naturally arises: What does the
Commission propose to do about it? Will the doctrines of judicial
immunity and fiduciary obligation be appropriately described in the
Code so that courts apply the right doctrine to the right facts? Will
the Code be clarified so that we see "willful and deliberate"
behavior for what it is, a breach of the duty of loyalty equal to a
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breach of the duty of care? If we alter the Code appropriately in
this manner, the policy debate itself will be in focus: what do we
want these standards to be?
Unfortunately, the Commission proposal would codify the very
confusion that thoughtful analysis suggests should be eliminated.
Worse still, the proposal actually adds two additional errors that
will mar and render doctrinally inconsistent Code provisions
describing trustee and DIP obligations and liability. The proposals
formally distinguish a trustee's liabilities in Chapter 7 from a
trustee's liabilities in Chapter 11. Perhaps worst of all, the
proposal, if adopted, would fundamentally alter the duties of the
Debtor in Possession even though the notes of the Commission
explicitly state this is not the drafters' intention.
The Commission's proposal reads as follows:
Trustees appointed in cases under Chapter 7, 11, 12 or 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code should not be subject to suit in their individu-
al capacity for acts taken within the scope of their duties as
delineated in the Bankruptcy Code or by order of the court, as
long as the applicable order was issued on notice to interested
parties and there was full disclosure to the court.
Chapter 7, 12 and 13 trustees only should be subject to suit
in the trustee's representative capacity and subject to suit in the
trustee's personal capacity only to the extent that the trustee
acted with gross negligence in the performance of the trustee's
fiduciary duties. Gross negligence should be defined as reckless
indifference or deliberate disregard of the trustee's fiduciary
duty.
A Chapter 11 trustee for a corporate debtor[ 4] only
should be subject to suit in the trustee's representative capacity
and subject to suit in the trustee's personal capacity only to the
extent that the trustee has violated the standard of care
applicable to officers and directors of a corporation in the state
in which the Chapter 11 case is pending.
Debtors in possession should remain subject to suit to the
same extent as currently exists under state or federal law.55
54. What of a trustee for a non-corporate Chapter 11 debtor? The Commission
proposal does not address this possibility. Wealthy individuals may file in Chapter 11, and,
if they grossly mismanage their own affairs, a trustee may be appointed.
55. Report, supra note 8, § 3.3.2.
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A. Word Choice-Simple Criticisms
I think before plumbing the Commission's proposal substan-
tively to see how the drafters handled the issues I just raised, it
would be best to examine the language for more basic errors. The
proposal, which is comprised of four unnumbered paragraphs,
speaks of three, not two, capacities in which a trustee may be held
liable for breach of fiduciary obligations:
" The first paragraph applies specifically to all filing chapters
(except Chapter 9) and limits a trustee's liability in his
"individual" capacity to acts outside the scope of his
authority;
" The second paragraph, which applies to Chapters 7, 12, and
13, subjects trustees to liability in their "representative" and
''personal" capacities for acts of gross negligence (which is,
as we shall see a very generous standard); and
* The third paragraph subjects Chapter 11 trustees to liability
in both their "representative" and "personal" capacities only
for a violation of the standard of care of officers and
directors of corporations in which the case is pending.
The meaning of a trustee's "representative" capacity seems
clear. The trustee is not "surcharged," that is, he will not be held
liable out of his salary and fees for a breach of obligation. Instead,
the trustee's failure will cost the estate of the debtor and, ultimate-
ly, the creditors. But what is the difference between a trustee's
"individual" capacity and the trustee's "personal" capacity? There
is a reason for this word choice, but it is not made clear in the
proposal. This failure opens the door to significant misunderstand-
ing, a la Sherr v. Winkler.
There is a wonderful scene in the movie, The Blues Brothers,
starring Dan Ackroyd and John Belushi. With their blues band in
tow, "Jake" and "Elwood" drive aimlessly through rural Illinois in
search of a "gig." They spot an obviously cowboy-themed bar and,
posing as a band called the "Good Old Boys," con their way into
a job. At one point, they ask the woman tending bar, "What kind
of music you got here?" The bartender responds genially, "We got
Country and we got Western; we got both kinds."
Well, there are two kinds of liability for a trustee within the
framework of a bankruptcy case and as imposed by a bankruptcy
judge: the kind that forces the trustee to pay out of his own pocket
and the kind that lets the trustee look to the assets of the debtor's
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estate. Somehow, the proposal would seem to find three. A casual
reading of the proposal might suggest that the terms "personal"
and "individual" mean the same thing, but this is not, I believe, the
intent of the drafters. Given the tendency of courts to draw
meaning from sloppy trust law terminology (as the Sherr court did
in its reading of Mosser), the language of the proposal should be
tighter. Indeed, at least one of the commissioners specifically
complained that the provision, on its face, was unclear.56
This sloppiness is especially disheartening since this proposal
was intended to clarify the present law. "Individual" immunity
applies to trustees who act within the scope of their authority and
should not be applied to trustees when beneficiaries of the
bankruptcy trust (creditors) allege a breach of fiduciary obligation.
The proposal does not make this distinction clear. In fact, the
report and explanation accompanying section 3.3.2 explicitly suggest
the opposite.57
B. Judicial Immunity as a Statutory Shield to Allegations of
Breach of Fiduciary Obligations
As you might guess, however, I am not concerned solely about
word choice, troubling as this language may be. I am concerned
about the substantive aspects of this proposal. My initial review of
the law in Part II suggests that a trustee's liability should be
evaluated against two discrete doctrines: judicial immunity and a
fiduciary's obligations to his beneficiary. Confusion in the law as
it now exists arises, to some degree, because the present Code does
not acknowledge this distinction and because courts fail to apply it.
The proposal does not merely mirror this confusion; it codifies it.
56. See Letter from James I. Shepard to Brady C. Williamson (Sept. 3, 1997) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Shepard Letter]. Commissioner Shepard voiced his opposition to
section 3.3.2 of the proposed changes on several occasions and articulated various defects in
that section, all to no avail. I would like to thank Commissioner Shepard for providing me
copies of this letter and other materials, as well as for spending a portion of his valuable time
discussing the issue raised in this article.
57. The Commission explains that
to hold a trustee personally liable for a breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff
would have to show (1) that the trustee was not acting within the scope of
judicial authority granted under the Bankruptcy Code or by court order;
and (2) that the trustee was grossly negligent in the performance of the
trustee's fiduciary duties.
Report, supra note 8, at 867.
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One of my primary criticisms of the law as it has developed is
simply this: courts, as well as drafters of codes, do not identify
doctrines as they deal with them. Often, just taking the step to
correctly name a rule or doctrine would force the judicial or
statutory lawmaker to recognize the dividing line between doctrines
(i.e. the line between the duties of care and loyalty and between
immunity and fiduciary law).
This is absolutely true of proposed section 3.3.2. Paragraph
one of the proposal describes the judicial immunity of trustees in
bankruptcy. It is a largely correct statement of the doctrine of
judicial immunity. I suspect this is the real reason that paragraph
one speaks of a trustee's liability in his "individual" capacity where
the other paragraphs speak of a trustee's liability in his "personal"
capacity. And yet, nowhere does paragraph one use the phrase
"derived judicial immunity." In this context, "individual" makes
sense. Either the trustee is an officer of the court acting within the
scope of his authority, in which case he is not liable to parties
harmed by his actions, or he is an "individual." The other
paragraphs deal not with judicial immunity, but with fiduciary
obligation.
Except for one glaring omission, paragraph one correctly states
the rule of derived judicial immunity. According to the drafter,
trustees "should not be subject to suit in their individual capacity
for acts taken within the scope of their duties."58 According to
the drafters, the scope of a trustee's duties in any of the bankruptcy
chapters is defined both by the Code and by an order of the court
where notice was given to all interested parties after full disclosure
of material information by such parties.59 This makes sense and
follows established doctrine. If a trustee follows a court's instruc-
tions he should not be held liable for unforeseen and unfortunate
consequences no matter how terrible, even as against beneficiaries
of the trust. Similarly, where the Code permits, and perhaps even
requires, the trustee to take some action, or in a reasonable trustee's
judgment, the Code permits such action, then the trustee should not
be later forced to pay damages out of his own pocket for taking
such action. This is not to say that persons harmed by the
bankruptcy process may not be made whole; it is just that under
58. Report, supra note 8, at 862.
59. Id. at 863-64.
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these circumstances it should not be the trustee's assets doing the
healing.
The drafters' language is good, but only so far as it goes. The
problem, for lack of better words, is that the "to whom" is missing
from the provision. Paragraph one does not state to whom the
trustee shall be liable in his individual capacity. The error-the
omission-is the failure of the Commission to limit the protection
of this proposal to non-beneficiaries of the debtor's estate. Recall
that there is ample justification for protecting judges and persons
who act for the court if they reasonably believe themselves to be
following the dictates of the Code or a court order. No one would
agree to serve in a bankruptcy case without this level of protection.
In this sense, although persons operating the debtor's business or
controlling its assets are called trustees, it is enough to consider
them merely officers of the court. Simple issues of fairness require
this result.
Not so, with respect to the obligations of trustees to beneficia-
ries. Trust law assumes that persons serving as trustees do so
accepting their obligations to beneficiaries.6" That trustees are
subject to liability is necessary to forestall problems of moral
hazard.
I suppose that the "whom" might be implied. After all, the
drafters use the word "individual," as opposed to "personal," to
describe the liability a trustee faces when acting outside his
authority. But this is a slim reed. As pointed out previously in this
article, courts routinely confuse scenarios requiring judicial
immunity analysis. Why would we expect such a subtle reading of
this language? This provision should be modified, at the least, to
insert language limiting protection to non-beneficiaries of the
bankruptcy trust.
Worse is the fact that a reasonable reading of the entirety of
section 3.3.2 suggests that the protection afforded by paragraph one
of that section would apply in cases where the complaining party
was a beneficiary of the debtor's estate (i.e., a creditor). This is
exactly the wrong result and, as in case law, mixes two independent
legal doctrines. Paragraph one applies to Chapter 7, 11, 12, and 13
trustees with no exceptions for suits by creditors. For example, the
second paragraph of the proposal creates personal liability for
60. We might make standards generous, but standards of behavior always exist, violation
of which should always subject trustees to personal liability.
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trustees acting in a grossly negligent fashion. Applying paragraph
one first suggests that this personal liability would only arise if such
grossly negligent actions were also outside the scope of the trustee's
authority.
Thus, the trustee would be judicially immune from the actions
of beneficiaries. Many of the actions that courts might term grossly
negligent, and certainly actions that reasonable persons would
describe as simply negligent, are typically within the scope of the
trustee's duties. The trustee merely performed these actions in
such a poor manner, and with such a lack of insight and foresight,
that we call these actions negligent. Moreover, much of what we
term "negligent" and even "grossly negligent" amounts to failures
to act and omissions. I suspect many courts would stumble if
forced to identify a failure to act as an action outside the scope of
authority. Again, at least one commissioner identified and objected
to this aspect of section 3.3.2, but to no avail.61
The explanation following section 3.3.2 reinforces this reading.
It states that "liability for a breach of fiduciary duty would attach
only to the extent that a trustee acted with gross negligence outside
the scope of the trustee's Bankruptcy Code or court ordered
authority., 62 The drafters thus clearly intended to limit creditors
by the immunity doctrine-the wrong result.
Similarly, Chapter 11 creditors would be unable to sue the
trustee "individually" even though the trustee is available "person-
ally" under paragraph three if courts read the judicial immunity
section as applying to motions raised against the trustee in
bankruptcy court. This is the error of the Tenth Circuit in Sherr
and the Commission's language virtually codifies this mistake.
C. Failure to Clarify the Real Content of a Bankruptcy Trustee's
"Care" and "Loyalty"
Part II of this article notes that, in addition to confusing
immunity doctrine with fiduciary doctrine, courts routinely misapply
and confuse the meaning of the basic fiduciary obligations of care
61. See James I. Shepard, Memorandum, Sept. 12, 1997 ("[T]here seems to be
considerable confusion in the area because of the attempt to apply fiduciary liability concepts
to actions by third parties, where no fiduciary duty exists."). Commissioner Shepard thus
identifies the correct doctrinal application of judicial immunity doctrine. Unfortunately, his
understanding of trustee liability and fiduciary duties was not fully incorporated into the final
proposal.
62. Report, supra note 8, at 867.
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and loyalty. This error is at least partly excusable because of the
lack of guidance provided by the present Code. Nowhere does the
Code explain the duties of loyalty and care. This confusion has
significantly impacted courts' willingness to "sock" trustees with
personal liability for breaches of their fiduciary duties. Unfortu-
nately, instead of. clarifying the law, the Commission's proposal
extends and reinforces this confusion. We see this when we
examine the second and third paragraphs of the proposal.
Paragraph Two treats the fiduciary obligations of all trustees,
except Chapter 11 trustees. Paragraph three of the proposal treats
the fiduciary obligations of Chapter 11 trustees. I will analyze
Paragraph two first.
1. Paragraph Two.-The first thing I noticed when reading
this section is not what is there and wrong, but what is missing-the
duty of loyalty. This is surprising. Although fiduciary obligations
of trustees and the DIP continue to be subject to debate63 and
misunderstanding, one would have at least expected the drafters to
distinguish between and explain the two major fiduciary obligations
of a trustee.
Paragraph two would hold the trustee personally liable (or at
least subject him to suit in his personal capacity) for acts that
constitute "gross negligence in the performance" of his "fiduciary
duties."64 "Gross negligence" is then defined as "reckless indiffer-
ence or deliberate disregard of the trustee's fiduciary duty.
65
This definition of the trustee's duty of care is circular.66 A
trustee's fiduciary duties are composed of the duty of care and the
duty of loyalty.67 The duty of care is correctly couched in terms
63. For a recent serious treatment of the fiduciary obligations of the DIP, see Cuevas,
supra note 29.
64. Report, supra note 8, § 3.3.2. Recall that personal liability under the Commission
proposal would be limited to the trustee's acts outside the scope of his authority.
65. Id.
66. Commissioner Shepard similarly failed to find substantive content within this
paragraph. For example, Commissioner Shepard voted against the Service and Ethics
Working Group Proposal # 7 which dealt with the liability of trustees and contained language
that ultimately became section 3.3.2. He states in a letter to Brady Williamson, Chair of the
Commission that "I have a great deal of difficulty reading the second paragraph of the
proposal to state its apparent intention. I don't mean to be so presumptuous, as to believe
that my suggested language is a paradigm of clarity, but I do believe that the proposal should
be restated." Shepard Letter, supra note 56.
67. A trustee also has the duty to remain impartial among beneficiaries. What
"impartial" means in the context of Chapter 11 has been subject to significant debate. See
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of negligence, that is, mistakes that the trustee made accidentally
and not deliberate behavior. In turn, negligence is itself a definable
term and relates to an objective standard of behavior against which
a trustee may compare himself. For example, in the world of
personal trustees, the standard against which the trustee may
compare himself might be "the reasonable and prudent trustee"
under similar circumstances and operating pursuant to the same
trust language. The common law has developed a fairly compre-
hensive series of cases, supplemented by treatises, that describe
what is "reasonable and prudent" in connection with investment
practices, business operations, etc.
If the drafters want the standard of a bankruptcy trustee to be
"gross negligence," then so be it. But this term must be defined,
as it is in the operation of personal trusts, with a standard against
which the trustee may compare his own behavior. Instead, the
drafters define gross negligence in terms of a breach of the trustee's
fiduciary duty, when the duty to avoid negligent actions (the duty of
care) is itself a fiduciary duty. This is, therefore, a totally meaning-
less definition. A trustee is to avoid gross negligence, which is a
breach of its fiduciary duty, which is, among other things, the duty
of care, which is the obligation to avoid negligence, and so it goes,
around and around.
It is hard to see how the drafters made this mistake when they
themselves cite, as support for their proposed standard, Prosser and
Keeton's definition of gross negligence. According to these two
giants of tort law, gross negligence is "a failure to exercise that care
which a careless person would use."6 8 This is a real, if somewhat
vague, standard and one that provides trustees a benchmark against
which to compare their own behavior. By contrast, a standard that
references only a trustee's "breach of fiduciary duty" does not
provide such a benchmark. Why the drafters failed to actually
define the most important term is a mystery to me; although, it
certainly comports with the "tradition" of the Code, which
originally failed to define the trustee's fiduciary duties.
Bogart, supra note 5, at 241-53.
68. See Report, supra note 8, at 861 n.2198 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 209, 212 (5th ed. 1984). The drafters display their
sophistication by quoting other possible standards for "gross negligence." Citing a federal
district case from Rhode Island, they note that gross negligence may be "reckless or
shockingly unjustified and unreasonable action." Id. at 861 n.2198 (quoting Leite v. City of
Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585, 591 (D.R.I. 1978)).
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Fortunately, the drafters have not, at least explicitly, incorpo-
rated the rule of the Tenth Circuit, announced in Sherr v. Winkler,
that personal liability follows only "willful and deliberate" behavior.
According to the Commission, a trustee will be liable in representa-
tive and personal capacities when acting with "reckless indifference
or deliberate disregard" for his fiduciary duties. 69 Recall that,
under the prescription of Sherr v. Winkler, personal liability would
follow the trustee only for "willful and deliberate" acts.70 As I
said earlier, this is a loose way of describing breaches of the duty
of loyalty. Although the Commission would retain personal
liability for deliberate behavior, it would also permit personal
liability for reckless behavior-behavior that is at least a step below
"willful and deliberate" and can be characterized as a breach of the
duty of care.
Thus, for example, a trustee must act to collect and preserve
assets of the estate.71 The failure to insure property adequately
would be a violation of the duty of care. Under Prosser's definition
of "gross negligence," this would be a violation only if, in failing to
insure the property, the trustee failed to exercise the care that even
a careless person would use under the same circumstances.
Assuming that the drafter intended the "fiduciary duty" mentioned
in paragraph two of their proposal to include the duty to preserve
the estate, then the trustee would violate this duty by acting
recklessly.72
2. Paragraph Three.-The final two paragraphs of the
Commission proposal deal with Chapter 11 trustees and the DIP.
These paragraphs turn the traditional understanding of fiduciary
obligations of the trustee, and hence the DIP, on their head. The
provision provides that a trustee may be subject to suit in his
representative capacity and personal capacity to the extent the
69. The drafters borrow this language from corporate governance law, not tort or trust
law. See id. at 861 n.2199 (citing Potter v. Pohlad, 560 N.W.2d 389, 392 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997)).
70. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Reich v. Burke (In re Reich), 54 B.R. 995 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985), as
modified, Bankr. Proc. Docket, No. 84-9041, Entry No. 33 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 3, 1986)
(trustee has an obligation to keep a building that was estate property clear of snow; roof of
building caved in). One court stated that "[c]oilecting and preserving the estate's property
is the primary duty of the trustee, and is not discretionary." In re Rollins, 175 BR. 69, 75
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994).
72. The trustee may also violate his fiduciary duty if his actions, although close to
deliberate behavior, are nevertheless not quite as culpable (i.e. reckless).
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trustee "has violated the standard of care applicable to officers and
directors of a corporation in the state in which the Chapter 11 case
is pending."73 Existing Supreme Court opinions, commentary, and
other case law indicate a basic doctrine: that the DIP derives its
fiduciary obligations from the trustee in bankruptcy. The Commis-
sion's proposal would reverse this rule. Since the Commission
explicitly states that it is not modifying the law governing the DIP,
when it clearly does, the Commission once again seems to misun-
derstand basic bankruptcy law doctrine.
Paragraph three of the Commission's provision would effect a
major change in the Code and in the case law. That provision
would create fifty different fiduciary standards for Chapter 11
trustees reflecting the corporate law of the fifty states of the Union.
This would engender an unnecessary disuniformity in Chapter 11
bankruptcy law and does not reasonably reflect the expectations of
the creditors. This proposal is especially surprising since one
primary goal of the Commission appears to have been to alleviate
some of the disuniformities that are part and parcel of bankruptcy
law as it exists today. For example, the Commission proposed
significant changes to the exemptions provision of Chapter 7 to
eliminate the differences in treatment among debtors from different
states.
Subjecting Chapter 11 trustees to the fiduciary obligations of
directors in states where Chapter 11 cases are filed does not make
sense in theory or in fact. Corporate law theorists have adopted a
"contractual" explanation of corporate governance. Creditors
contract for the return of their investment but not fiduciary rights.
Absent a later insolvency, creditors cannot sue directors alleging
breach of care or loyalty. Therefore, creditors do not typically care
what regimen of fiduciary obligations exists in any particular state.
Instead, creditors examine the credit worthiness of debtors by
looking to balance sheets, assets, etc.
By contrast, shareholders contract for equity in the company
and for the fiduciary obligations of directors and officers.7 4 This
is the primary modern theoretical and doctrinal justification for
saddling equity owners in the fifty states to different corporate
73. See Report, supra note 8, § 3.3.2.
74. This view, particularly that shareholders bargain for any specific package of fiduciary
obligations, has been criticized as unconnected to the real motives and decisions of equity
investors. See generally Bogart, supra note 5, at 164-68.
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governance regimes. Indeed, some corporate law theorists argue
that corporations ought to be able to "bargain out" of fiduciary
obligations altogether. After all, they say, the inability to sue
directors will be known to reasonable investors and reflected in
share prices."
It is undeniably true, however,'that creditors do not bargain or
typically care what regime of fiduciary obligations govern corpora-
tions that owe them money since they typically have no involve-
ment in corporate governance. And yet, the expectation that a
particular regime of corporate governance mechanisms govern a
particular debtor, expectations that only shareholders typically
have, is the only basis I can see for imposing different state statutes
and case law on different Chapter 11 trustees.
76
Thus, there is no good reason to subject creditors in Chapter
11 cases to varying sets of fiduciary obligations, whether the
managers at the time are trustees or the DIP Instead, creditors
from any particular state and concerned with any particular debtor,
"reasonably expect the terms 'honesty,' 'prudence,' and 'compe-
tence,' as such terms apply to trustee behavior, to mean the same
whether the bankruptcy occurs in Massachusetts or Florida. 77
This is the present rule, and it ought not be changed by statute.
75. See id.
76. I have previously written:
Critics of the contract theory of corporations might be surprised by the reorga-
nization process in Chapter 11. The contract achieved by creditors and the debtor
in that process is not metaphorical, it is the real thing. However, the observations
of these critics retain their validity when applied to the description of the
corporate environment of the DIP outside the process of negotiating the plan of
reorganization. In fact, their criticisms-that owners of the corporate entity do not
bargain with directors and managers for any particular set of fiduciary obliga-
tions-are even more legitimate in this context. Where shareholders may meet
and force the election of new directors, or force unplanned meetings in order to
cause management and the board to address their concerns, these rights may be
limited in Chapter 11. The ultimate stakeholders of the reorganized debtor in
many Chapter 11 cases-the creditors-do not have the right during the Chapter
11 case to vote at such meetings even if such meetings do take place. The normal
mechanisms of corporate governance are severely undermined in Chapter 11. The
argument that the articles of incorporation, as modified by state corporate
governance law, reflect an agreement among the stakeholders and management
carries even less force following the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The
elimination of traditional mechanisms of corporate governance therefore creates
a valid rationale for the imposition of fiduciary duties upon the DIP that are more
rigorous than those typically imposed on the prepetition corporate fiduciary.
See id. at 184-85 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
77. See id. at 220.
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Chapter 11 cases are often cross-jurisdictional with, perhaps,
the exception of some single asset cases. Creditors come from
many states and sometimes from beyond the borders of the United
States. Why should Delaware law, as opposed to New York law or
Georgia law, govern the standard of care and loyalty followed by
the trustee assigned to oversee the reorganization? Again, the only
possible reason would be the expectation of the creditors. Yet,
there is nothing in a creditor's typical decision to lend money or
sell goods on credit to a debtor that indicates any such expectation.
Indeed, there is just as little reason to believe that creditors
expect different sets of fiduciary duties to apply to the DIP
depending on whether the corporation was incorporated in one
state or another. The reasons for this are essentially the same;
creditors expect duties of loyalty and care for trustees to be the
same regardless of where the case is filed or where the corporation
is incorporated. As just stated, creditors do not bargain for any
specific set of fiduciary obligations when lending money to the
debtor corporation. They have only the right to sue if the debtor
breaches the loan contract; fiduciary obligations are not part of the
bargain, at least absent insolvency.
Even if creditors expect fiduciary duties of the states in which
debtors incorporate to follow trustees in Chapter 11, why in the
world would creditors, or anyone else for that matter, expect the
duties of states in which cases are filed to follow trustees? Debtors
do not necessarily file in those states where they incorporate.
There is absolutely no theoretical basis for making corporate
governance issues dependent upon the states in the which cases are
pending.
The Code does not prescribe the nature of the DIP's fiduciary
obligations any more than it does for the trustee. The only hint the
Code gives is section 1107(a) which states that the DIP shall
"perform all the functions and duties ... of a trustee.,78 Inter-
preting this language, the Supreme Court twice stated that the DIP
inherits the fiduciary obligations of the trustee in bankruptcy.
79
The federal bankruptcy judiciary essentially responded by creating
a federal common law of trusts which is applied first to trustees and
derivatively to the DIP.80 Many bankruptcy courts have taken the
78. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1994).
79. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
80. See generally Bogart, supra note 5.
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Supreme Court at its word and simply applied this common law of
trusts to the DIP Even those courts that spout corporate gover-
nance terminology when evaluating the DIP (i.e., by referring to
the business judgment rule) really apply something more strenuous
to directors and officers of Chapter 11 companies.
There are striking differences between a trustee's duty of care
and that of a typical corporate director. Similarly, although the
differences may be less evident, there are real differences between
a trustee's duty of loyalty and those of a corporate fiduciary. As
we shall see, however, the Commission's proposal saddles trustees
with the standards of a corporate fiduciary and, in so doing, alters
the required behavior of the DIP as well.
I suspect the reader is well aware of what is meant by the
"business judgment rule." The business judgment rule is a layer of
protection afforded corporate directors and officers of solvent
companies prior to the filing of the petition. The rule protects
these individuals from suits by shareholders alleging that directors
made decisions that ultimately harm the company. The business
judgment rule may be formulated in a number of ways, but, usually,
it states that directors and officers will not be held liable for their
decisions affecting the company so long as they were rational and
informed when the decisions were made and they were not
otherwise acting in a disloyal manner.81 This standard allows
81. The American Law Institute's formulation of the business judgment rule protects
directors if they acted loyally and in good faith, in an informed manner, and "rationally
believe[d] that the business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation." PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(a) (1994). A review of cases and scholarly articles
discussing a corporate director's duty of care and the correct application of the business
judgment rule is beyond the scope of this short article. Primary judicial statements of the
rule may be found in such well known cases as Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) and
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). The business judgment rule insulates
directors from liability for their poor decisions; it may even protect them from negligent
behavior. One well known court opinion explains the rule as follows:
The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the managerial prerogatives
of Delaware directors under [Delaware business statutes] .... It is a presumption
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment
will be respected by the courts.
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted). The business judgment
rule is the subject of much scholarly discussion and debate. For example, see Andrew G.T.
Moore, II, The 1980's-Did We Save the Stockholders While the Corporation Burned, 70
WASH. U. Q. 277 (1992); Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's
Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477 (1984). I discuss the business
judgment rule and its various formulations in Bogart, supra note 5, 168-73. In that article,
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directors to act in a painfully stupid manner and escape liability for
their acts. This protection has been deemed necessary because
without it, so goes the argument, individuals would not agree to
serve as directors.
However, bankruptcy courts require something greater than
the rational person standard when evaluating the behavior of
Chapter 11 directors, which is a minimal level of care. Even where
courts suggest that the business judgment rule exists in Chapter 11,
these same courts routinely examine the reasonableness of a
corporate director's decisions.8 2 Bankruptcy courts may grant
wide discretion, but they do not really technically apply the
standard corporate rule. This is not surprising since the duty of
care for a trustee outside of bankruptcy is that of a prudent
person.83 Bankruptcy courts have looked to the Restatement and
other treatises, as well as state court opinions, to flesh out what a
trustee's care ought to be. Trustees, while often granted wide
discretion in the operation of a beneficiary's business, do not have
the benefit of the corporate business judgment rule.
The duty of care as applied in the world of solvent, non-
bankrupt companies is, thus, quite different from that actually
applied in the world of Chapter 11, notwithstanding the suggestions
that the business judgment rule lives in bankruptcy. Unsurpris-
ingly, there are also differences between the duty of loyalty as
actually applied by bankruptcy courts and as it exists in a normal
corporate context, but these are more subtle. The actual wording
of a court's prohibitions on disloyalty is the same regardless of
one's status as a trustee or corporate fiduciary. The primary
difference is that corporate fiduciaries typically exculpate them-
selves from liability under state law by having a board of disinter-
ested and independent directors vote to ratify the disloyal acts.
These state laws do not apply to trustees. And no bankruptcy
court, at least that I know of, has entertained (or has been asked
to entertain) arguments that directors are shielded from liability for
disloyal conduct by state exculpatory statutes.s4 This could change
I also examine and reject the notion that the business judgment rule, as it is traditionally
understood, is truly effective in Chapter 11 cases. Id. at 220-27.
82. See Bogart, supra note 5, at 222-23.
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959) (providing that a trustee owes
a duty of "such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with
his own property"). See also Bogart, supra note 5, at 235-38.
84. See generally Bogart, supra note 5, at 239-40.
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if Congress adopts the Commission's proposal. After all, if the
standards of corporate fiduciaries govern trustees, then the business
judgment rule and exculpatory statutes are essential parts of those
standards.
There may simply be a difference in the tone of courts when
dealing with allegations that a trustee has been disloyal, as opposed
to a corporate director. Trustees are expected to deal with the
wealth of their charges in the utmost good faith. True, other
fiduciaries, including real estate agents and corporate directors are
subject to these strictures. Yet, to be a "trustee" is to incur special
and significant expectations of honesty and good faith.
Thus, there is a single overriding characteristic of fiduciary
obligations in Chapter 11. Whether the manager of the reorganized
debtor is a trustee or DIP, the standards are those of the trustee in
bankruptcy and the DIP's fiduciary obligations flow from these
standards. Previously, if you wanted to know what "care" and
"loyalty" meant as applied to the behavior of the DIP, you would
first look at the meaning of those terms in the context of the
trustee's behavior.
Now, look at the Commission proposal. The trustee's
standards are rendered by statute to be the standards of corporate
fiduciaries, abrogating much of the case law developed from the
time of the Bankruptcy Act and on. If the DIP's duties are
derivative of the trustee's, then, under the Commission's proposal,
the DIP's obligations are returned back to state corporate gover-
nance law. However, unlike normal state law corporate gover-
nance, the debtor will be governed by the standards of the state in
which the case is pending. This is a bizarre twist.
In short, the drafters have turned the basic premise of fiduciary
obligations in Chapter 11 upside down. Since a DIP's fiduciary
standards are based on those of the trustee, the DIP's obligations
will simply be the standard corporate fiduciary obligations of
directors and officers. For example, where I previously concluded
that the business judgment rule does not technically exist in
85. See Nancy B. Rapoport & C.R. Bowles, Jr., Has the DIP's Attorney Become the
Ultimate Creditors' Lawyer in Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases?, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 47, 56 (1997) ("The standard of care under the 'common law trustee' line of cases isn't
that much different from the standard of care under the 'corporate fiduciary' standard,-it's
just more stringent.").
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Chapter 11 under the present Code,86 it most certainly will exist
following the adoption of the Commission's proposal. There will
be fifty different standards and rules with slightly, and sometimes
not so slightly, varying language.
The wording of the duties vary subtly from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Presumably, since the statutes are state laws, trustees
will be forced to look at the case law in each jurisdiction to
determine what these statutes mean. Bankruptcy courts could
interpret the state statutes without reference to what state courts
have done, but I think this is very unlikely. I predict that when
and if this proposal is passed by Congress and signed into law by
the President, there will be a rush by the major law publishers to
create new "handbooks" for trustees describing their duties. These
handbooks will necessarily provide state law sections covering the
law of all of the states and explaining the nuances of corporate
fiduciary law in each of the states. Similarly, creditors' committees
and their counsel will be forced to learn and apply a huge array of
differently worded corporate fiduciary standards.
3. Paragraph Four.-Before concluding, I would ask the
reader to look at the last paragraph of proposed section 3.3.2. This
paragraph suggests that the standards governing the DIP remain
unaltered by the proposal. I have suggested throughout this article
that the failure of the Commission to take doctrine seriously-as
worthy of consideration apart from policy ends-damages the
proposal and will result in a poorly fashioned law. Paragraph four
brings me back to this point.
How is it possible for the drafters to make such a point in the
first place? There is really only one answer. They did not
understand the impact of their own statutory modification on the
Code. The reason for this is their failure to understand the
doctrinal impact of placing the DIP in the shoes of the trustee.
The Code says now that the DIP has the duties of the trustee.
While arguing that this remains unchanged, the proposal reverses
this present state of affairs.
Paragraph four states that the Commission proposal will not
alter the status quo regarding the DIP And yet, I am worried that,
86. As previously noted, Chapter 11 trustees are granted very wide discretion in the
operation of an ongoing business, and justifiably so. But this is still a long way from the
rational-but-stupid standard one finds in the business judgment rule.
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in an almost Orwellian way, courts and commentators will forget
how the law was understood to operate prior to adoption of the
proposal and conclude that the blanket incorporation of the
different states corporate fiduciary law into Chapter 11 was always
the regimen of Chapter 11, when it certainly was not.
If this provision is adopted, I suspect that later courts and
commentators will focus upon the rationale of the Commission, as
evidenced by its report and the language of the proposal. In a
sense then, the explanation the Commission gives for its proposal
is a kind of quasi-legislative history. The Commission, however,
cannot rightfully tell us what the original drafters of the Code
intended, only what they mean to do today. Unfortunately, the
dramatic modification of the standards governing the DIP,
accompanied by the Commission's statement that the rules
governing DIP have not changed, does just that; it suggests that this
most recent Commission's reading of the rules governing the DIP
is the true and correct understanding.
IV. Conclusion
The Commission's Proposal 3.3.2 is doctrinally confused and
ought not to be placed into law, at least as is. It incorporates into
the fiduciary standards governing Chapter 11 trustees, and hence
the DIP, the doctrine of derived judicial immunity. This is a
terrible error from several vantage points. The Commission has
successfully ignored an opportunity to correct what thoughtful
commentary and many courts believe to be a misreading of
Supreme Court directive. The law permitting the DIP, trustees,
and creditors relying on the Code to plan their behavior will be
cluttered even further. Worst of all, beneficiaries of the estate-the
creditors-may well find their actions against trustees for breach of
fiduciary duties stymied by courts convinced that the trustee's
careless acts were within the scope of the trustee's authority.
The Commission distinguishes between Chapter 11 and the
other chapters for purposes of defining the liability and fiduciary
obligations of trustees in a way previously not seen in bankruptcy
law.
The Commission successfully avoids an opportunity to explain
what "care" and "loyalty" mean in bankruptcy. This would have
been hard but valuable work and would have done more to aid
courts and trustees than just about anything else the Commission
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might have attempted. The Commission might have carefully used
trust law terminology.
The Commission also proposes to stand upside down the
present understanding of the DIP's fiduciary obligations. Instead
of looking to the nature of a trustee to discern the obligations of
directors of a Chapter 11 company, following adoption of the
Commission's proposal, trustees will be forced to look to state law
corporate fiduciary obligations. And departing from any reason-
able expectation, trustees will be bound by the judiciary obligations
imposed on corporate directors in the state where the bankruptcy
case is filed. The Commission would impose this change while
suggesting that the standards of the DIP remain untouched.
Despite my criticisms, I am not despondent. I take the state
of bankruptcy law seriously and recognize its impact on the lives of
others. But I cannot control the decisions of the Commission, let
alone Congress, and I will (and must) accept and work with what
Congress actually adopts. Yet, this brings me full circle, back to
the "still small voice." My father began law practice nearly forty
years ago. One of the lawyers who hired him was a man known
affectionately as "Mr. Max." 87
When Mr. Max would leave for home at the end of the day, so
my father says, he was fond of telling younger lawyers still working
in the library or at their desks, "Save some work for tomorrow."
This was a still small voice that intense young lawyers probably
easily ignored, but they should not have. I cannot imagine that Mr.
Max really wanted lawyers who had trials or transactions to
prepare to leave for the day before their work was complete.
Instead, Mr. Max saw young lawyers working on projects that were
not immediately due and letters that could wait until morning; in
other words, the inexhaustible supply of work that is always on a
lawyer's desk and is never really finished. As to this, Mr. Max's
advice was to "save some work for tomorrow." He knew, I think,
that a busy lawyer's sanity and ability to reflect on a client's
problems necessarily required the knowledge of when to quit and
go home for the day.
So too with us and with our review of the proposals of the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission. No Code will ever be
87. This was in Atlanta, Georgia, and a common and old southern practice was to show
formality and respect for older persons, as well as affection, by addressing that person by
title and first name.
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perfect; and even in the best of statutory projects such as this, there
are bound to be serious flaws-problems that later Commissions
and Congresses will have to address. This is true of the work of
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission. It is unclear
whether and how much of this Commission's report will be adopted
by Congress and what changes to the Commission's proposals
Congress will make. But even if Congress adopts and the President
signs into law a bill containing provision 3.3.2, I will remember Mr.
Max's admonition. Like the young lawyers who both frustrated
and amused Mr. Max, we simply will not be able to correct all that
is wrong or improve that which can be made better, either in the
original Code or in the Commission's proposal. The Commission
has saved us all work for tomorrow. Mr. Max's voice was the voice
of reason and reflection then and now: it is time to go home for the
day.
